Criminal Law 2025/26 Update for July 2026 Exam
Candidates are not expected to recall or recite any of the following case law that has been cited. However, candidates may be expected to understand the principles underlying these cases.
Chapter 5 (Homicide offences)
In R v Grey [2024] EWCA Crim 487, the Court of Appeal emphasised that in order to prove the offence of unlawful act manslaughter, the prosecution must prove the base offence in full first (both the actus reus and the mens rea). R v Bukhari & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1353 approved Grey and confirmed that the principle applies equally to secondary party cases.
For the purposes of your SQE1 assessment, if your MCQ involves unlawful act manslaughter and the issue relates to liability, always start with the base offence. Can you prove the base offence in full (both the actus reus and mens rea)? If not, there can be no liability no matter how dangerous the act itself is.
Chapter 6 (Non-fatal offences against the person)
In R v Hobday [2025] EWCA Crim 406, the Court of Appeal was tasked with considering the operation of consent in cases involving the branding of an initial onto a buttocks. Restricting the earlier case of R v Wilson [1997] QB 47 to its own facts, the Court of Appeal concluded that a vulnerable 17-year-old girl could not validly consent to the defendant branding his initial onto her buttocks. There was no good reason in law to permit this sort of behaviour, especially given power imbalance between her and the defendant, her desire for illicit drugs, the potential mental health issues and self-harm implications. The dangers associated with domestic abuse and relationships of a controlling/coercive nature were clearly at the front of the Court of Appeal’s mind.
For the purposes of your SQE1 assessment, pay close attention to what types of behaviour may be lawfully consented to. If the injury caused is of ABH or above, the court must be satisfied that there was a ‘good’ or ‘lawful’ reason for the activity. Hobday confirms that branding as a form of romantic gesture is not a good or lawful reason.
In R v BXQ [2025] EWCA Crim 1088, the Court of Appeal was faced with the issue of multiple causes in cases of grievous bodily harm. In summary, the Court concluded that the issue will be whether D2’s involvement was ‘entirely separate’ to the act of D1’s and whether it ‘caused or contributed to some comparatively minor further injury’. Whether the act of D2 is ‘entirely separate’ will largely depend on the amount of time that has passed since the cessation of D1’s violence and any other surrounding circumstances. If this is the case, D2 may avoid liability for inflicting/causing GBH. However, if the case could be viewed as a ‘single continuing attack, which D1 began and in which D2 joined, and that the attack as a whole resulted in really serious injury’, then D2 will be equally as liable for inflicting/causing GBH.
In BXQ, Holroyde LJ found that D2 had joined D1 ‘immediately after the initial blow’ (at [26]) and it was therefore open to the jury to conclude that this was a ‘single continuing act’ for which D2 could be equally liable.
For the purposes of your SQE1 assessment, if you are dealing with an issue of causation involving multiple parties, keep the principle of BXQ in your mind. Is this a single continuing act, or has the second defendant acted entirely separate to the first defendant? Understanding causation and the impact of these principles on the liability of defendants is essential.
Chapter 7 (Theft offences)
In R v Lakeman [2026] EWCA Crim 4, the Court of Appeal found that in-game currency/in-game wealth was capable of amounting to ‘property’ for the purposes of s 4 of the Theft Act 1968. The Court afforded the widest possible interpretation of the words ‘other intangible property’ in s 4, and concluded that the words ‘are apt to catch any thing which can as a matter of normal use of language be described as capable of being stolen, unless there are good reasons why such a thing should be excepted. Such exceptions include the pure information principle, as we have explained it; (quite possibly) the different treatment of intellectual property; and exceptions in respect of particular sui generis assets in certain circumstances, such as those excepted in s4 of the Act and corpses and body parts, for social and historical reasons.’ (per Popplewell LJ at [84])
For the purposes of your SQE1 assessment, pay close attention to the type of property that has been alleged to have been stolen. ‘Pure information’ is not capable of being stolen, nor can other excepted categories (eg human body parts). However, the law adopts the broadest interpretation of the categories of property that can be stolen, and you should bear in mind this decision if you come across forms of intangible property that may be stolen.
Chapter 8 (Fraud offences)
In R v Sharma [2025] EWCA Crim 1122, the Court of Appeal emphasised that cases involving fraud by false representation must be abundantly clear as to what the ‘representation’ is. It must be a representation of fact, or law, or the present state of mind of the person making the representation. A ‘promise or prediction’ is not a representation for the purposes of the offence, and does not become one simply because the promise is broken. However, an inference can be drawn or implication can be made that a promise reflects the present state of mind of the defendant. If the state of mind of the maker of the statement (ie the defendant) is that they had no intention to keep the promise, then they will have made a false representation.
For the purposes of your SQE1 assessment, pay close attention to the alleged representation made by the party in your scenario. Is it a statement of fact, law, or of their present state of mind. Following Sharma, is it possible to draw an inference as to what their present state of mind is?
